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Background: During the 2009/A/H1N1 pandemic, the main burden of the patient management fell on primary
care physicians (PCPs), and they were the principal implementers of pandemic policies. Broad involvement of PCPs
in the pandemic response offered an excellent opportunity to investigate the challenges that they encountered.
Objective: To examine challenges faced by PCPs as they implemented pandemic policies in Australia, Israel and
England before the 2009/A/H1N1 pandemic vaccine became available.
Methods: This is a qualitative descriptive study that employed in-depth semi-structured interviews with 65 PCPs from
Australia, Israel and England. The data were analysed thematically to provide a detailed account of the themes.
Results: Challenges in three fields of the pandemic response were identified. (i) Consultation of patients was challenged
by the high flow of patients, sick and worried-well, the necessity to provide personalised information about the disease
during consultations, and unfamiliar antiviral treatment. (ii) Performance of public health responsibilities was complicated
in regards to patient segregation and introduction of personal protection measures. (iii) Communication with the health
authorities was inefficient, with no established route to provide feedback about the pandemic policies.
Conclusions: The experience of the 2009/A/H1N1 pandemic highlighted the centrality of primary care in the pandemic
response. Despite intensive pre-pandemic planning, numerous barriers for implementation of the pandemic
policies in primary care were identified. Investigation of three different approaches for involvement of PCPs in the
pandemic management showed that none of these approaches worked smoothly.
Keywords: Primary Health Care, Pandemics, Disease outbreaks, Public Health, Qualitative research, Health politics,
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During the 2009/A/H1N1 pandemic, the main burden of
managing the patients fell on primary care physicians
(PCPs) [1, 2], and they were the principal implementers
of pandemic policies. Broad involvement of PCPs in the
2009/A/H1N1 pandemic offered an excellent opportun-
ity to investigate the challenges that PCPs encountered
and to improve preparedness plans.
This study aimed to examine challenges faced by
PCPs as they implemented pandemic policies in three* Correspondence: marina.kunin@unimelb.edu.au
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creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/countries, Australia, Israel and England. It investigated
the views of PCPs (General Practitioners (GPs) in
Australia and England), who consulted patients before
the 2009/A/H1N1 pandemic vaccine became available.
The rationale for selection of these countries was based
on facts that all three countries have a high standard of
public health, universal coverage for health services, and
high health care accessibility [3–5]. All three countries were
in a state of high pandemic preparedness, had developed
pandemic response plans, stockpiled personal protective
equipment (PPE) and antiviral drugs [6–8]. The existing re-
search links in these countries were also an important fac-
tor needed to facilitate the logistics of data collection.
Despite stated similarities, linkages between PCPs,
other ambulatory health services, hospitals and Healthicle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://
) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
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decentralisation of the health system, its financing, and re-
lationship with regulatory and legal system [3–5]. This dif-
ference in the level of decentralization of the primary care
services is expected to ensure greater generalizability of
the findings.
Three approaches to involvement of PCPs in the
pandemic response
When the World Health Organization declared a “signifi-
cant increase in risk of a pandemic”[9], each of the three
countries employed strategies to delay the appearance of
the disease and to contain its spread. During this contain-
ment phase, a range of policy measures, such as active epi-
demiological investigation, isolation of cases and school
closure, were used. This period, from the first confirmed
case of the pandemic flu until the official announcement
about the change in the response strategy, lasted 4 weeks in
Victoria, 8 weeks in Israel and 9.5 weeks in England. Each
of the three selected countries employed different strategies
for the involvement of PCPs during this period [10].
The Israeli approach during the containment phase
was to protect PCPs and the public directing all sus-
pected cases to the hospitals where they were tested and
treated [10]. PCPs started to be fully involved in the re-
sponse once the disease became spread in the commu-
nity. At that time, it was obvious that the disease was
not as severe as previously thought.
In both Australia and England, PCPs were at the front
line from the outset of the pandemic, expected to both
test and treat all suspected patients [10].
In Australia, PCPs were in charge of preparing a triage
plan for suspected cases and introducing infection con-
trol measures in their clinics, testing, prescribing anti-
viral treatment and reporting the suspected cases to the
health authorities [10]. Their role was intensive and con-
stant throughout the pandemic period.
In England, the approach was to prevent primary care
clinic attendance by the suspected patients [10]. Through-
out the containment phase, most suspected patients were
assessed by PCPs during home visits. Then, advice for
self-treatment and prescription of antivirals through Na-
tional Pandemic Flu Service (NPFS) was provided. People,
who fulfilled the criteria according to the symptom-based
clinical algorithm, were given an authorisation code that a
‘flu friend’ – someone who did not have H1N1 – could
use to collect antivirals. Only at-risk and patients with se-
vere symptoms were advised to consult PCPs so that the
majority were kept out of primary care clinics [10].
Method
This is a qualitative descriptive study [11] that employed
in-depth semi-structured interviews with PCPs to under-
stand their experience from their own perspective [12].Sampling
The sampling strategy was directed towards recruitment
of “information-rich” cases [13]:
 PCPs who practiced in areas with substantial 2009/
A/H1N1 activity and/or started to consult the 2009/
A/H1N1 patients early in the pandemic outbreak.
 PCPs who were more involved in implementing
practice policy (for example, PCPs who directed the
response of their practice to the pandemic).
Participant recruitment in Australia
The first group of doctors was selected from PCPs in
Melbourne. PCPs were recruited using the School of
Primary Health Care at Monash University research
links with the Divisions of General Practice in Mel-
bourne. An invitation to participate in the research was
published in the newsletters of the Divisions of General
Practice in Melbourne. In addition, a number of PCPs
were recruited using the “snowball” sampling method
[14] when the participants indicated PCPs who might be
interested to participate in the research.
Participant recruitment in Israel
The second group was selected from the primary care
physicians in Israel using the research links of Hadassah
Hospital with the Organization of Family Practitioners
and the Organization of Child Practitioners in Israel.
One of the authors (DE), advised on potential partici-
pants based on the familiarity with PCPs who directed
the pandemic response of their practice and information
about areas with substantial 2009/A/H1N1 activity. PCPs
were contacted over the phone by one of the authors
(MK) and, after an explanation about the research, were
invited to participate.
Participant recruitment in England
The third group was selected from the PCPs in London
using Kings College research links with PCPs of Lambeth
and Southwark Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) in London.
The research was advertised in the surgeries of these two
PCTs with the support of one of the authors (MA). PCPs,
who expressed interest in the research, were contacted
over the phone or in person by one of the authors (MK)
and, after an additional explanation about the research, in-
vited to participate.
Interviewing
All interviews were conducted in a timeframe as close as
possible to the 2009/A/H1N1 pandemic to improve data
quality and to avoid recall bias (Table 1).
All interviews lasted 30–45 min and the schedule in-
cluded a standard set of topics presented by the inter-
viewer (MK), which included:
Table 1 Time and place of the qualitative data collection
Place of data collection Australia (Melbourne) Israel (Central, Tel-Aviv
and Jerusalem districts)
England (London)
Ethics Approval Monash University Ethics Committee Hadassah Hospital Ethics
Committee
South West London Research Ethics
Service and NHS Lambeth and Southwark.
Abbreviation for representative
quotations
M, M(p) for pilots I L
Time of data collection June, August and September 2010 July 2010 July 2010
Number of interviewees 20 - main study 5 - pilots 20 20










Male 16 12 8
Female 9 8 12
Age:
Less than 30 0 0 2
30–39 1 5 12
40–49 5 5 3
50–59 15 7 3
60–69 4 3 0
Year of practice:
Less than 5 1 2 12
5–10 1 5 2
11–20 3 4 1
21–30 15 9 5
More than 30 5 0 0
Total N 25 20 20
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2009 pandemic
 Expectations from the health authorities
 PCPs’ view on the role of the primary care during a
pandemic outbreak
 Successes and challenges in managing the 2009/A/
H1N1 pandemic.
These general topics were developed into specific
questions in the process of the discussion. The current
report includes only data that were prompt by questions
about the pre-vaccination period.
Data analysis
The data were transcribed verbatim and analysed the-
matically to provide a detailed account of the themes.
The analysis was informed by the six-phase approach of
Braun and Clarke [15]. Organization of the data was
assisted through the computer program NVivo9.
After the initial familiarization with the data through
reading of the complete interview transcripts, initial
codes were generated by the first author (MK). This ana-
lytical approach was inductive, which allowed the codes
to be developed “on the go”. In this way, a new code was
created every time a feature of the data appeared which
was relevant to the research question as the researcher
systematically worked through the data giving equal atten-
tion to each data item [16]. The initial coding was accom-
panied by the “memoing” process of writing remarks
about the data, questions for further clarification and the-
orising. The memos were used for later reflection about
the data.
When the coding was completed, the categories were
reviewed by three of the authors (MK, LP and DE), re-
fined and three broader categories that describe PCPs
activities were agreed upon.
Results
Sixty five PCPs were interviewed for the study. Charac-
teristics of the study sample are presented in Table 2.
In organizing data thematically, 7 themes emerged as
the main concerns of PCPs with the burden on primary
care during the pre-vaccination period of the pandemic.These themes were further grouped under three broad
categories (Table 3).
Patient consultations
PCPs reported that patient consultations included an as-
sessment, provision of antiviral or supportive treatment,
reassurance of worried-well and provision of information
in the form of personalised advice.
High flow of influenza patients and worried-well
PCPs were unanimous that management of worried-well
patients was one of their key roles during the 2009/A/
H1N1 pandemic. They described media induced anxiety
which imposed resource constraints on primary care.
The level and type of difficulties PCPs encountered were
different in the three countries.
In Australia, where the spread of the pandemic ap-
peared early, PCPs struggled to manage the patients
concurrently performing public health responsibilities of
Table 3 Themes emerged from the data
1. Patient consultations 1.1 high flow of flu patients and worried-well
• surges of people who were concerned they
may get sick
1.2 provision of information
• patients seeking personal reassurance
1.3 antiviral treatment
• limited experience in prescribing antiviral
drugs (Oseltamivir (Tamiflu) and Zanamivir
(Relenza))




• difficulty of isolating flu patients in primary
care clinics
2.2 personal protection
• convenience of using PPE in primary care
• supply of PPE
3. Communication with
the health authorities
3.1 communication of policies and guidelines
to PCPs
• redundant and conflicting communication
from multiple sources
• guidelines - frequently updated, lengthy,
not oriented to primary care, conflicting with
on-the ground experience
3.2 bottom-up communication from PCPs
• time consuming reporting to the authorities
• no route to provide feedback about the
on-the-ground experience to the authorities
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ing special arrangements for swabbing and antiviral
treatment:
“…we were juggling all these delivery issues, approval
process issues, lab results…we tried as best we
could…”(M2)
In England, PCPs described how assessing suspected
cases during home visits put a strain on their work dur-
ing the early stage of the pandemic:
“…we were expected to visit everybody at home and
take swabs with masks and gowns which was
hideously impractical.” (L12)
English PCPs noted a decrease in the flow of patients
when NPFS was launched but reported assessing numer-
ous patients who sought reassurance after having con-
sulted the NPFS:
“…it (NPFS) was so algorithmic that a lot of our
patients came back and… we’d have to have another
conversation.” (L11)English PCPs expressed their support for the NPFS
organization; however, concerns with the safety of the
NPFS phone consultations were raised. In particular, the
fact that the NPFS was staffed with “non-clinically
trained people making decisions to treat people with
drugs”(L17). PCPs pointed to the fact that “telephone
consultations… are difficult entities for GP’s themsel-
ves”(L11), which require experience in making a correct
diagnosis without seeing a patient.
In Israel, the same level of anxiety did not concur
with the spread of the disease in the community. The
flow of worried-well ended before the 2009/A/H1N1
patients started to appear in primary care in increased
numbers:
“At the beginning patients were very anxious because
of the reports about deaths… but at the peak of the
second wave… it was clear that here it is not so bad…
so it was less anxiety..” (I17)Provision of information
PCPs were the main channel for delivering the pandemic
policies to patients, usually in a form of specific clinical
advice and treatment. Although the health authorities in
the three countries made a considerable effort to provide
information about the disease, infection control and
treatment to the public, PCPs saw themselves as a “nat-
ural source of information for the patients” (I14).
In Australia, many PCPs reported that the provision of
information took a great amount of time, taking into
consideration the anxiety of the patients:
“The vast majority just needed checking out and
reassurance… I went over how flu is very different
clinically from a bad cold, and symptoms for both,
millions of times.” (M7)
In England, where the NPFS was providing advice
over the phone, PCPs still reported surges of patients
who were seeking PCP advice. Many PCPs reported
that the main concern of the patients in this respect
was the applicability of the general information, avail-
able through the NPFS and mass media, to their spe-
cific situation:
“… I think most of our patients did request advice even
if there was kind of general published advice around. I
think they valued speaking to someone, so we did have
a large influx at that time, and that continued even
after the telephone line (NPFS) came on line.” (L11)
In Israel, many PCPs also reported the quest for per-
sonalized advice from their patients:
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… what about my mum, what about my dad, my
neighbour got it what if the kids will be exposed?” (I14)Antiviral treatment
In Australia and England, where the first cases were
treated in primary care during the initial period of the
pandemic, strict guidelines provided for prescription of
the antivirals created clinical practice difficulties. PCPs
in Australia and England were required to seek permis-
sion from the health authorities to prescribe the drug
and in this respect they felt that the health authorities
did not rely on their clinical judgment:
“There were rules (to prescribe the drug), but I think
this is where the government’s got to realise that GPs
(PCPs) are not stupid. I am sure they (PCPs) are going
to usually make decisions in the best interest of the
population… They (government) don’t have any
confidence in the people that treat people all the
time.” (M3)
Many GPs from each of the three countries reported
that they did not use antiviral drugs to treat flu patients
prior to the 2009/A/H1N1 pandemic and were generally
unfamiliar with these drugs (Tamiflu and Relenza). This
contributed to their confusion regarding the treatment
and concerns with its safety and necessity:
“I don’t believe in it… I’ve got an impression that it
(Tamiflu) was advised to pacify the public: get Tamiflu
and everything will be all right. Because it is hard to say
that there is a disease that has no treatment…” (I8)
I’ve never prescribed Tamiflu until the swine flu season
… it was a bit nerve wracking, because you’re
prescribing a drug you don’t really know much about,
new territory, you don’t know the risks, you don’t know
the pros, and it was a bit unsettling.” (L18)Public health responsibilities
In addition to consulting patients in increased numbers,
PCPs had to perform public health responsibilities that
were out of scope in their usual clinical routine. These
responsibilities included segregation of patients and ap-
plication of personal protection measures in order to re-
duce the disease transmission. Many PCPs felt that these
public health responsibilities were imposed on them
without an appropriate consultation process and that the
health authorities did not acknowledge that their role as
PCPs “is different to the role of the public health officer”
(M17). While PCPs are a “person’s advocates” (L4), “public
health policy is specifically geared not to consider individ-
ual patient needs”(M17).Patient segregation
Many PCPs reported that it was impossible to separate
patients in a busy clinic. Even in a situation where a
spare room for isolation was available, PCPs felt that it
was not good practice to have several patients simultan-
eously in an isolation room, before assessing them for
the 2009/A/H1N1.
In Australia, a common practice to separate the sus-
pected flu patients was to assess them in their car or to
ask them to wait in a car instead of in a waiting room
until a PCP was ready to consult them.
“..we asked people to ring ahead, we asked if they had
a fever or any symptoms of flu, … to stay in their
cars… And we would usually give them a mask to
walk them in, and walk them straight into the
consulting room…” (M7)
In England, the approach was to keep the suspected
patients out of practices and to assess them during home
visits or phone consultations. It seems that many pa-
tients with the flu symptoms were turned away from the
primary clinics, but the practice of putting them into an
isolation room was not uncommon:
“…we tried to encourage people with flu to stay at
home as per the guidelines, but when people were
coming, to try and have separate rooms that we could
…put them in and segregate them.” (L14)
In Israel, in some Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO) clinics that assessed flu patients for a limited
period at the end of the containment phase, an effort
was made to separate flu patients. Regular primary
clinics in Israel started to consult pandemic flu patients
when the disease was widely spread in the community,
and there was overall acceptance of the fact that the sep-
aration was not feasible:
“When the disease had turned into a pandemic there
was no sense in separation, it was impossible.” (I15)
GPs from the three countries reported that policies in-
troduced to low disease transmission in a clinic (separ-
ation of patients in clinics in Australia, assessment in
the hospital during the containment phase in Israel, and
home visits or phone consultations in England), were
not always successful because of the lack of cooperation
from patients. A considerable number of patients did
not report flu symptoms till they got to see the doctor,
thus mingling with other patients in the waiting room:
“Well naturally we had people that came in … despite
all the publicity or despite people telling them or
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did have people that did come in… The problem is
they’d probably been sitting in the waiting room for
half an hour before they got to your room and before
you realised.” (L14)
Personal protection
PCPs from all three countries described that PPE, such
as masks, gloves and gowns, did not “make for good
patient-doctor communication or rapport”(L18), and
their use was time-consuming. The main difficulty was
the necessity to change PPE between consultations.
Many PCPs reported that they ceased using PPE after a
number of attempts due to the inconvenience of use:
“… I can’t change an apron 20 times… It takes time
that I can’t afford to spend…” (I14)
In all three countries, another reason for low compli-
ance with the PPE use was related to the limited cooper-
ation from patients who failed to identify themselves as
flu patients. PCPs described examples of consultations
when patients started to talk about their symptoms dur-
ing the consultation. At this stage, PCPs felt, it was late,
and also inconvenient to put on PPE:
“…I felt it would be ridiculous to put on a mask after
he is already in my room and he was sitting for maybe
half an hour in the waiting room…” (I6)
In Israel, disinclination to use PPE was particularly
common among PCPs, and they indicated that patients
if they were provided with masks, usually did not use
them too:
“No, I didn’t put on the mask… Patients could take
masks, but they did not put them on…” (I8)
In Australia, the burden of personal safety arrange-
ments was especially pronounced in the context of PPE
supply. Australian health authorities expected PCPs to
stockpile PPE in the event of a pandemic. PCPs, how-
ever, were not prepared to stockpile PPE more than “a
core stock for our staff”(M19) as they were reluctant to
part-fund the public health response:
“… that becomes not an issue of primary healthcare,
why we should be bearing the cost of it (PPE)? Cost for
us is a major issue.” (M19)
Communication with the health authorities
Communication with the health authorities was fre-
quently criticised by PCPs from the three countries.
Two types of communication problems were raised:information flow from the health authorities to update
PCPs about the latest guidelines, and communication
from PCPs to report about the suspected cases or to
provide feedback about the policies.
Communication of policies and guidelines to PCPs
PCPs from the three countries described the communi-
cation of policies to PCPs as “not synchronous with the
on-the-ground experience”(M2), guidelines being lengthy,
not oriented to primary care, too frequently updated.
Many complained that critical updates were published in
the media before they were sent to PCPs by the health
authorities. This situation was described by one doctor
as “playing catch-up with the popular media all the
time”(M16) and some PCPs felt that it challenged the
patients’ trust in their doctor as a source of reliable
information.
In Australia and England, PCPs also reported commu-
nication being redundant and sometimes conflicting as
the updates were available from “a variety of sources, not
one single source that was the authoritative voice.”(L11).
Bottom-up communication from PCPs
In Australia and England, early involvement of PCPs in
the pandemic management implied that they were the
main source of surveillance for the health authorities,
and they were required to report every suspected case.
The reporting was mandatory for arranging the viro-
logical test and prescription of antivirals. This reporting
was described by PCPs from these thwo countries as being
time-consuming and hard to perform in primary care:
“…you had to wait 45 min on the phone to get an
approval number … and without that approval you
couldn’t initiate the treatment.” (M2)
In Israel, the opinion of PCPs was particularly negative
regarding health authorities not being using their expert-
ise to receive feedback about the situation on the coal-
face and that “there was not enough dialogue with
primary care physicians”(I19). They believed that they
could contribute to improve the case definition sensitiv-
ity early in the pandemic, to provide feedback about the
severity of the disease and the applicability of the guide-
lines to the reality of primary care. Many felt resentment
for not being able to influence decision-making in a field
that directly related to their professional activity:
“…if primary care physicians are not convinced, the
message is not passed to the public” (I14)
Discussion
The data concerning perceived difficulties of the pan-
demic response in primary care identified challenges
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studies countries. These challenges were influenced by
the timing and severity of the disease spread, level of
PCP involvement in the response, support provided to
PCPs by the health authorities, and organization of pri-
mary care services in a country.
Challenges for the Australian approach to PCP
involvement in pandemic management
Appearance of the pandemic flu in Australia in May
2009, against the background of autumn Influenza-like
Illnesses (ILI) [17], put PCPs at a disadvantage compared
to their counterparts in Israel and England where the
disease occurred outside the regular flu season [18, 19].
ILI in Australia peaked in mid-July and early August,
after which they gradually decreased, reaching normal
spring seasonal rate by mid-October [17]. The low sensi-
tivity of the case definition during the early stages of the
pandemic paved the way for the transmission of the dis-
ease in the community [1] and resulted in a short and
very intensive containment phase.
Primary care clinics were supposed to develop and im-
plement pandemic management plans for their clinics
according to the workplan kits provided by the author-
ities in each Australian State or Territory [6]. Primary
care clinics were in charge of preparing a triage plan for
the suspected cases, introducing infection control mea-
sures and reporting the suspected cases to the health au-
thorities [20].
The first crucial challenge described by Australian
PCPs was the workload associated with the large flow of
patients. During the containment phase, the surge of the
pandemic flu patients was concurrent with the surge of
the worried-well, both appearing against the background
of patients with other winter infections. This workload
was aggravated by the patients’ demand for personalized
advice, despite the fact that the authorities provided
comprehensive general information to the public about
the disease, infection control and treatment. This re-
vealed the tension between the public health approach
in provision of information to the public and guidelines
to PCPs, and personalized care that the patients ex-
pected to receive from PCPs.
The next crucial issue was practice reorganization in
order to introduce infection control measures. These
measures necessitated introduction of additional proce-
dures in primary care clinics, such as patient segrega-
tion. In Australia, PCPs were expected by the health
authorities to reorganize their practices in such a way
that they would become responsive to the pandemic.
Australian PCPs experienced difficulties reorganizing
their clinics to introduce infection control measures as
the main orientation of modern primary care is on
chronic care delivery, given the increasing prevalence ofpatients with chronic diseases and multimorbidity in
general practices [21, 22]. The usual barriers stated were
the limited space in clinics and difficulty in room occu-
pancy reorganization.
Reporting of the surveillance data for the public health
authorities during the early stages of the pandemic pre-
sented an additional challenge. Australian PCPs were
asked to report every suspected patient to local Public
Health Units in order to arrange for the viral test and
antiviral drugs. Our data confirmed the finding of other
studies regarding the time consuming nature of the sur-
veillance reporting during a pandemic response [1, 23].
This study adds further that PCPs felt this compulsory
reporting (before taking the swab test and prescribing
antiviral drugs) represented a lack of trust from the
health authorities in their professional decision making
and intrusion into their clinical autonomy. The unset-
tling feeling that they were not able to provide clinical
treatment for patients without the permission of a public
health officer was the dominant theme for Australian
PCPs, and it represents the clash of responsibilities in
the face of poor role delineation.
Personal safety was the next crucial issue for Austra-
lian PCPs. Barriers for stockpiling PPE and antivirals for
prophylactic treatment of the staff in primary care were
reported in previously conducted studies concerning
pandemic preparedness in primary care [24, 25]. The
challenge of the PPE access during a disease outbreak, in
terms of its cost and shortage, was also reported previ-
ously in relation to the SARS [26–28]. At the beginning
of the pandemic, the health authorities expected PCPs to
purchase PPE “through normal suppliers”[29]. PPE was
part of the National Medical Stockpile in Australia but it
was only made available to PCPs from this source later
on in the outbreak [30]. Our results confirmed the find-
ing of previous reports that PCPs saw the supply of PPE
and prophylactic treatment as the responsibility of the
health authorities [24, 25], and suggested that the PCPs’
response demonstrated their reluctance to bear the costs
of the public health response.
Challenges for the English approach to PCP involvement
in pandemic management
In England, the disease appeared outside the regular flu
season and the pandemic flu spread was affected by school
closure over the summer break [31]. The disease spread in
two waves – mid-July and September-December [19].
In England, the approach was to avoid primary care
clinic attendance by the suspected patients during the
whole pandemic period. Throughout the containment
phase, this was achieved by the strategy of assessing the
suspected patients during home visits. While home visits
were a routine practice and an important component of
the workload in primary care in England in the past
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all consultations [33]. Our data elicited the challenges of
implementing this approach in primary care during pan-
demics. The burden of workload associated with home
visits, phone consultations and surveillance reporting to
the health authorities was evident from the interviews
with English PCPs.
When it was perceived that the pressure of home visits
became unbearable, the NPFS was organized by the De-
partment of Health [34]. The approach of the supported
self-care and wide distribution of the antivirals to symp-
tomatic flu patients was part of the pre-pandemic plan-
ning for primary care in England [35]. This, indeed,
resulted in a reduction in PCPs’ consultations [36, 37].
The data from the interviews showed that this approach
was generally welcomed by PCPs, which is consistent
with the findings of a cross-sectional survey conducted
in the UK [38]. However, this in turn generated further
concerns about the safety of phone consultations per-
formed by non-clinical staff, that were also reported in
other studies [38, 39].
PCPs from England indicated that they consulted
many patients who needed personalized clinic advice.
This is despite the extensive information provided by the
NPFS. The possible explanation for this phenomenon is
that the provision of information from the official
sources addressed the cognitive risk judgment of the
population but not the “emotional” concerns. These
were found to be significant predictors of behavioural
responses during the initial stages of the 2009/A/H1N1
outbreak [40]. Also, it was reported that while about
90 % of members of the public across the UK were satis-
fied with the amount of information about the 2009/A/
H1N1, 37 % still had information they wanted to know
[41]. Between the additional information that the public
wanted to know, the most common types were details
on symptoms, and advice on prevention and treatment
[41]. Since these pieces of information represented con-
cerns that are usually addressed during primary care
consultations, this may provide an explanation for the
high presentation rate of patients seeking personalized
advice.
Challenges for the Israeli approach to PCP involvement in
pandemic management
As in England, in Israel, the influenza pandemic oc-
curred outside the regular flu season, which facilitated
the detection of the suspected cases. The disease spread
in three escalating waves – at the beginning of August,
mid-September and mid-November [18], and was much
longer compared to regular flu season in previous years
[42]. The efforts to contain the disease in Israel were fa-
cilitated by the school closure over the summer break
and autumn festive season [31, 42].The Israeli policy of treating all suspected cases in
hospitals at the beginning of the outbreak decreased the
risk to PCPs of exposure to the potentially virulent virus,
and freed them from the workload associated with the
reporting of the cases to the health authorities and pa-
tient segregation. PCPs started to assess flu patients
when the disease became widespread in the community.
By this time, the information about the overall mild na-
ture of the virus became available from countries where
the first wave of the disease has already passed, such as
Australia.
The challenge of the increased workload when PCPs
started to consult the flu patients was described. How-
ever, Israeli PCPs indicated that the surge of the anxiety
in the community, characterised by increased consulta-
tions for people who were concerned they may get sick,
finished before the main surge of pandemic flu patients.
Interestingly enough, Israeli PCPs expressed limited
compliance, compared to their Australian counterparts,
with the need to introduce infection control measures in
the clinics, as they believed these measures would not be
effective in a situation when the disease had spread in
the community. Similarly, Israeli PCPs were not enthusi-
astic about the PPE use. In contrast to the situation in
Australia, PPE was distributed to primary care clinics
through HMOs free of charge, so the issues of cost and
accessibility were not raised during the interviews. PCPs
emphasised the inconvenience of PPE use in primary
care in terms of rapport with patients and time needed
to change protective gear between consultations.
Previously, the compliance with PPE use during SARS
in Singapore was explained using the Becker Health Be-
lief Model which acknowledges that changes in behav-
iour to reduce threat depend on the perceived
vulnerability, severity, effectiveness and barriers [26]. In
that study, PCPs from Singapore changed their behav-
iour to accommodate the supply problems and incon-
venience of PPE use, as they believed that the
effectiveness of PPE in decreasing the threat on their
lives outweighed the barriers. It is likely that Israeli
PCPs, who started to consult flu patients later in the
pandemic, had a lower risk perception of the disease,
compared to their Australian counterparts, which re-
duced the perceived usefulness of PPE and the infection
control measures. Thus, Israeli PCPs were unwilling to
overcome the barriers of making changes in their usual
practice, as they did not see the need for these changes
based on the prevailing epidemiology of the disease.
Compared to the data from the interviews in two
other countries, it seems that Israeli PCPs were more
critical of the health authorities for not involving them
in the pandemic planning and decision making during
the pandemic. They did not acknowledge the fact that
they were protected during the containment phase of
Kunin et al. Israel Journal of Health Policy Research  (2015) 4:32 Page 9 of 11the disease because all the suspected cases were man-
aged in the hospital, and many expressed the idea that
the pandemic response of the health authorities was
“over-kill”.Challenges shared by PCPs from all three countries
The data elicited generic challenges that were evidenced
in each of the three countries. These generic challenges
were related to perceived difficulties in following pan-
demic guidelines. The identified themes revealed that
PCPs experienced difficulties in translating pandemic
policies and guidelines into practice. These difficulties
were consistent with the conceptual framework that ex-
plains barriers to clinical recommendations implementa-
tion [43]. This framework suggested that to conform
with guidelines, physicians must be aware and be famil-
iar with them and overcome barriers of negative attitude
and external barriers.Barriers affecting knowledge
In this study, all participants were aware of the pan-
demic guidelines early in the pandemic. Health author-
ities sent the alert documents to PCPs directly and
through the mid-level organizations that duplicated or
customized these alerts to local circumstances. No re-
ports of limited guideline accessibility were found. How-
ever, some PCPs revealed that their familiarity with the
guidelines was limited.
High volume of information and lack of time present
barriers for clinical guideline adherence in general [43].
During the pandemic response, the lack of time pre-
sented an obstacle to keep with the pace of guideline up-
dates. As the result, PCPs felt uncertain concerning
whether they provided treatment according to the latest
update.
Multiple sources of information challenged the effect-
iveness of the emergency communication with PCPs.
PCPs received information from different organizations
(national, state, mid-level authorities and professional
organizations) and they reported that these communica-
tions were uncoordinated and confusing. This finding is
consistent with the results of a recent study that redun-
dant messages during emergency situations increase
communication challenges [44].
Pandemic guidelines not oriented to primary care and
lacking understanding of the primary clinics were re-
ported by PCPs. A similar problem was found during
the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong [45]. PCPs in this
study especially highlighted the problematic applicability
of the guidelines for infection control and personal
safety measures. Our findings suggest that the guidelines
to control infection transmission in primary care should
take into consideration the infrastructure and resourceconstraints as well as the importance of personalized
communication between PCPs and their patients.
PCP attitudes to pandemic guidelines
Another factor that complicated implementation of the
pandemic guidelines was that PCPs harboured doubts
about some of the pandemic policies. Specifically, lim-
ited agreement was reported concerning the policies for
antivirals prescription. The low level of confidence in
antiviral medication was not exclusive to PCPs and was
also found among hospital health care workers [46]. Dif-
ficulties in treatment with an unfamiliar drug highlighted
PCPs’ concerns about implementing public health policy
in which they were not convinced, or which contradicted
their clinical judgment.
Interviewed PCPs felt that they could improve the
relevance of the guidelines to primary care by adjusting
them to the severity of cases that they consult in primary
care, as opposed to the cases that were admitted to the
hospital. However, there was no established route to
provide feedback about the pandemic policies.
Barriers affecting PCP behaviour
The ability of PCPs to implement pandemic policies was
affected by the involvement of mass media in policy dis-
semination. As distinct from the regular clinical guide-
line communication, policy updates during the
pandemic were happening in an atmosphere of constant
media attention. This framed public response to the
public health messages from the health authorities dur-
ing the 2009/A/H1N1 pandemic.
Despite the extensive public health advice that was
communicated by the health authorities through the
mass media, the public’s concerns about the relevance of
the communicated information to their own health was
not satisfied. As the public see PCPs as a trusted source
of information about their health [47], the patients went
to the PCPs asking them to translate the public health
information to the individual patient level. This quest of
the public for personalized information increased pri-
mary care consultation rates which formed operational
difficulties at the primary care level. Apart from the
pressure of workload associated with increased consult-
ation rates, PCPs in this study reported finding them-
selves in an awkward position when they were not
provided with the timely information from the health
authorities to respond to the concerns of their patients.
In many instances, mass media was reporting about the
policy changes before health authorities had sent the of-
ficial updates to PCPs.
Scope of the study
In analysing key aspects of the challenges for the pan-
demic response in primary care, this study is confined to
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H1N1 pandemic in three countries: Australia, Israel and
England. This study was designed to provide analytic
generalizations and did not aim to draw quantitative in-
ferences about the population of PCPs in large. The pur-
pose of this study was to open up new ideas and to
contribute new findings to the emerging field of the in-
fluenza pandemic preparedness.
Conclusion
The experience of the 2009/A/H1N1 pandemic
highlighted the centrality of primary care in the pan-
demic response. Despite intensive pre-pandemic plan-
ning, numerous barriers for implementation of the
pandemic policies in primary care were identified. Inves-
tigation of three different approaches for involvement of
PCPs in the pandemic management showed that none of
these approaches worked smoothly. Each of the investi-
gated approaches, as well as apprehension of the primary
care response in general, presented a unique experience
that is important to take on board in the evaluation of the
pandemic response and planning for its improvement.
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